NEW!!!! 2015 Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

1.Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Points and Authorities

Newly Discovered Evidence. Petitioner contends in summary that he was not given a fair trial under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth amendment or the fourteenth amendment due process or equal protection clause

Discussion I on Denial Of Instruction On Voluntary Intoxication 

The trial court abused its discretion at the guilt phase, [abuse of discretion implies arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking where the court exceeds all bounds of reason], all of the circumstances being considered (see PEOPLE v GIMINEZ), Erred in denying petitioner request for specific jury instruction on “voluntary intoxication”, embodied in CALJIC No.4.21 (see people v baker 1954), there was substantial evidence before and after the denial by the court or relevant substantial evidence to sustain voluntary intoxication instructions, request by petitioner trial counsel, see investigating agency taped recorded interview (T-32,46,47,49,52). to negate specific intent that evidence od diminished capacity could rebut the presumption (10 CAL.3d 724). See People v Modesto, 59 CAL.2d 722, (1) substantial evidence was before the jury on the subject aforementioned, the jury itself requested instruction on related questions of law, (RT-3121); the prosecutor himself during penalty phase vior dire confirmed that it was from petitioners taped interview by the police, that “the juror  all on their own decided that there was some indication of diminished capacity” (RT-3107,4766), Prosecution witness, Delisa Brown testified to the truth of the matter, under oath that petitioner was acting weird and was “spaced out”, the trail court in denying, voluntary intoxication instruction, stated Delisa Brown. testimony, that petitioner was spaced out. The trial court was faced with a specific question from the jury on the “diminished capacity” issue. As well as a specific request from defense counsel for an instruction on intoxication (RT 3127), the trial court instructed the jury with what can best be described as a half the truth a reading of penal code 28

“AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY THERE SHALL BE NO DEFENSE OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY, OR IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE IN A CRIMINAL ACTION OR JUVENILE ADJUDICATION HEARING.” I READ THAT VERBATIM. THAT IS THE LAW OF CALIFORNIA. (RT 3122)

IN CONTEXT, THIS INSTRUCTION OBVIOUSLY WOULD GIVE THE JURY THE ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PETITIONERS DRUG USE IN DECIDING WHETHER HE HAD THE REQUISITE MENS REA FOR THE CRIME.

That the jury was not to consider the issue of petitioners intoxication was made virtually explicit by the judge.

In answer to your question… regarding so-called diminished capacity, first I want to point out to you the instructions that I gave you in that matter, which state on the first page: “Your duty is to apply the rules of the law that I state to you to the facts as you determine them and in this what to arrive at your verdict.”(RT 3122) in other words, since the judge wasn’t asking the jury to consider the effects of petitioners intoxication, they were not allowed to do so, even if they agreed with petitioners statement to the police officer that he didn’t “know what it was about” because he was “smoking pretty tough” (T-47).

The court denial of an instruction on intoxication was based upon an erroneous finding that “there is no evidence that anybody was under the influence of anything in this case”,(RT 3128) and specifically an erroneous recollection of petitioners statements to the investigating officer(RT 3128) ; the legal issue was again raised by the defense in a new trial motion, but the court reiterated that “there is no evidence of intoxication.” (RT 3254)

The Prejudice is obvious. even without a full and correct instruction on the use of voluntary intoxication evidence, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on intent a the guilt phase and penalty phase. it was also improper for the court of appeals to base its holding on it conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support petitioners claim for intoxication defense, under state law, since it Is not the province of federal habeas court to reexamine state court determination on state law questions. Lewis v. Jeffer, 497 U.S 110 S CT.3092,111 L Ed.2d 606. Pp.479-481.

A DEFENDANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE THE JURY DETERMINE EVERY MATERIAL ISSUE PRESENTED BY THE EVIDENCE. AND SAID THAT FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON SUCH AN ISSUE IS PREJUDICIAL PE SE. SUCH A MATERIAL ISSUE IS PRESENTED BT THE EVIDENCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THOSE CASES WHEN THE RECORD CONTAINS ANY EVIDENCE DESERVING OF ANY CONSIDERATION WHATSOEVER RELATIVE TO IT. PEOPLE V. GARCIA (1984) 36 CAL.3D 539.556

Moreover, such a rule would in many cases, including the present one, in effect require the defendant to testify even where there was competent evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude that he lacked the necessary MENS REA as a result of voluntary intoxication, this aspect of Williams and Frierson, if appropriately interpreted, would infringe petitioners right not to testify, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution, article 1, 15 of the California constitution and 930 of the California evidence code. and finally this discussion is concluded and will continue in the next phase, and accordingly, petitioner is entitled to new guilt trial where he is entitled to present the issue of intoxication tot he jury now the argument.

ARGUMENT  I

Petitioner Darren Williams, was entitled to a jury trial on all the issues presented by the evidence; the right was denied; and the denial of such a right is in itself a miscarriage of justice within section 13 of article VI of the California constitution. (people v Castillo 70 Cal 2d 722.730-731). Moreover the evidence of malice afterthought is not overwhelming , that in absence of the error there is reasonable probability that a result more favorable to petitioners would have been reached. People v Watson. 46 Cal.2d 818,836.                           The first such question is presented is whether the court should instruct  upon necessarily included offense. The general rule is that the defendant is entitled upon request to instructions on necessarily included offense which the evidence tends to prove. (E.g., People v. Miller, 57 Cal.2d 821,829-830. Section 1159 of the penal code providing for convictions of lesser included offenses is absolute on its face and does not contain an exception for prosecution under section 4500 or any other statute.  The requirement to instructions on lesser included offense is based on the elementary principle that the court should instruct the jury on every material question. (E.g. People v. Carmen, Supra, 36 Cal. 2d 773.) The state has no interest in a defendant obtaining an acquittal where he is innocent of the primary offense charged but guilty of a necessarily included offense. Nor has the state any  legitimate interest in obtaining o=a  conviction of the offense charged where the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of the charged offense returns a verdict of guilty of that offense solely because the jury is unwilling to acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of wrongful conduct constituting a necessarily  included offense. likewise a defendant has no legitimate interest  in compelling the jury to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of guilt. the courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.

FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON INTOXICATION AND SPECIFIC INTENT: 

petitioner next contends that the trial court erred in failing instruct the jury pursuant to (CaALJIC) no. 4.21, that if it found that petitioner, Darren Williams , was intoxicated at the time of the offense, it could consider such voluntary intoxication, in determining whether petitioner had the requisite knowledge, and intent for an aider and an abettors, or mental state required for felony murder, or for premeditated and deliberate first degree  multiple murder. At the trial did request pin point instructions under (CALJIC) NO.4.21. (RT-3127). The trial court gave a partial instruction to the jury, with what can best be described as a half truth reading of penal code 28, an instruction that dealt with the effect of diminished capacity caused, INTER ALIA, by intoxication, the trial court ambiguous, and misleading instructions to the jury, inference to penal code 28(b), the rial court denial of an instruction on intoxication was based upon an erroneous  supposition, that “there was no evidence that anybody was under the influence of anything in this case”, (RT-3128), on the contrary there was ample evidence to support an instruction on voluntary intoxication, see police transcripts (T-32,46,47,49,52). Also see reporter transcripts, (RT-5935-6, 5941-2, 6430,6433). The diminished capacity doctrine has the potential applicability of (CALJIC) NO.4.21. which deals with the effect of intoxication on the defendants actual state of mind, not on his mental capacity. petitioner, Darren Williams, initial contention that (Caljic) No. 4.21, should be given sua sponte finds support in the case-law. in a number of decisions have specifically held that inappropriate case a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the principles embodied in (CALJIC) No. 4.21. (See People v baker (1954) 42 Cal 2.d 550. 576[286 P2.d 705], People v Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal 2d 522,527-528, People v Robinson (1970) 5 Cal . App 3d 43,48. As these cases suggest although the potential effect of intoxication on an individual mental state may not be aware, without an instruction, that while ” no act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition” (22, subd. (a)). It is nonetheless legally permissible for jurors to consider a defendants voluntary intoxication in determining whether he acted with  the specific intent or prescribed mental state required for a particular offense.(22, subd. (a)). Thus when the evidence warrants and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendants theory of the case (people v sedeno(1974). The principles embodied in (CALJIC) NO.4.21. is one of “The general principles of law” See people v martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524,531, on which the trial court must instruct the jury even in the absence of a request. the trial court point that the evidence was presented at the guilt phase in this case was insufficient to warrant such an instruction was erroneous, their were multiple indications of drug abuse, [see Police interview of Darren Williams,(T-32,46,47,49,52)]; [Reporter transcripts, 5934-6,5941-2,6430,6433]; [Defense counsel reminded the court of Delisa Browns testimony that petitioner Darren Williams, was “Probably Spaced Out” on the morning of the killings, and he argues that this justified an instruction on voluntary intoxication.The trial court disagreed, saying: “The words “spaced out” whatever they mean don’t necessarily mean intoxicated. I know a whole lot of people referred to as spaced out based on their personal lack of ability to focus their thought and actions”. Petitioners voluntary intoxication would qualify as “substantial,”there was evidence that petitioner voluntary intoxication had an effect on petitioners ability to formulate intent, Delisa Brown testified that petitioners was spaced out and the fact when petitioner heard multiple gun shots, he ran from the resident, the shoots brought petitioner out of drug induced, voluntary intoxication high, once the shots were fired by Cox, and the facts that at the penalty phase it was testified to that petitioner had a chronic drug problem, see (RT 5935-6, RT 5941-2, RT 6430, RT64330); see Delisa Brown testimony, probably was spaced out (RT 2638-9), however, well taken. In People v Flannel (1979)25 Cal.3d 668 , A case involving the question whether  there sufficient evidence of intoxication to support a diminish capacity instruction, the appropriate standard governing a trial courts duty to instruct on an issue,” In  substance when diminished capacity is at issue a trial court first evaluate the evidence. If the defendant provides evidence enough to deserve consideration by the jury, I. e. evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable men could have concluded that there was diminished capacity sufficient  to negate the requisite criminal intent [citation], the court must so instruct. a  trial court should not however measure the sustainability of the evidence by understanding to weigh the credibility of the witness, a task exclusively relegated to the jury. (CT 477-482) two of the jurors had informed defense counsel of the lack of a vote immediately after the jury hung on the issue of special circumstances (RT 3254) if the evidence should prove minimal and insubstantial, however, the court need not instruct on its effect.[citation], in other words the court should instruct the jury on every theory of the case, but only to the extent  that each is supported  by substantial evidence. [citation], doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused. [citation], (Flannel, Supra, 25 Cal 3d At PP.684-685)

I.THE PREJUDICIAL  NATURE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS APPEARS MOST CLEARLY IN THE DIFFICULTIES THAT IT CREATES FOR THE  “JURY” IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE STATED IN PEOPLE V. WELLS, 33 CAL.2D 330, 346-358 [202 P.2D 53], THAT EVIDENCE OF A MENTAL INFIRMITY, NOT AMOUNTING TO LEGAL INSANITY, IS ADMISSIBLE AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION.

Petitioner complains of the partial instructions relating to the issue of premeditation and deliberation. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to correctly instruct the jury on the effect of his intoxication on the question of the intent with which he committed to the acts charge to sustain adding and abetting. the jury was given an instruction based on the 28(b) of the penal code’. The fact that an instruction  on intoxication (though inadequate)was given, indicate that the trial judge had satisfied himself that the evidence was… sufficient to put the question ‘within the province of the jury.’ his judgment on this question would see to settle all doubt on the matter… the failure to give the instruction in the language of section 28(a) and 22 of the penal code was unquestionably prejudicial error.The defense based on intoxication raised an entirely separate issue and should have been covered by a separate instructions that was requested by defense and denied by the trial court (RT 3127). (People v Sanchez 35, Cal2d 522,528)  Moreover, the fact that the court did an inadequate instruction (RT 3122), On voluntary intoxication “After, Petitioners defense requested pinpoint instructions on voluntary intoxication (RT- 3127).  The Misleading and ambiguous instruction, RT 3122, On voluntary intoxication was enough to create a doubt in the minds of the juror. (RT-3122), although the reviewing court might hesitate before holding that hthe absence of any instruction on voluntary intoxication is a situation such as that printed in this case is prejudicial error, when a partial instruction has been given the court cannot but hold that the failure to give complete instructions was prejudicial error. ‘the facts and the partial instructions given might well lead the jury to believe that petitioner intoxication was not relevant. It is finally contended that the court has no duty on its own motion to give an impartial instructions based on section 28 of the penal code (b) Petitioner admits that he did request an instruction but argues that the trial court was obligated correctly to instruct the jury on all the factual issues raised by the evidence presented. as has been repeatedly held, It is incumbent upon a court in a criminal case to instruct the jury of its own motion, charging them fully  States v Kaysed, 4888 F 3d 1070 .

Discussion II

Petitioner Darren Williams conviction was illegally obtained in violation of his right , to confrontation and coss examination in violation of 5th 6th and 14th amendments.
The prosecution made no attempt to CROSS- EXAMINE THEM, HE RELIED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ALLEGEDLY UNANIMOUS SILENT REPLY OF THE JURORS TO THE CLERKS QUESTION WHEN THE VERDICT WAS READ “Is this your verdict, so you say one, so you say all?” (3240) When he had already presented to the courts, and which had been reviewed and found not to create a sufficient conflict. [both parties waived polling of the jury at the time of the verdict was announced]. Despite (1) The judges prior admitting to the prosecutor that in the absence of a testimony form the juror there would be no conflict in the evidence, (2) The prosecutor unexplained failure to produce such testimony– from which a strong interference could be drawn to that prosecutor had followed the courts recommendation to seek an affidavit but had been unable to obtain a juror who would contradict the three affidavits on file, apart from the unlikelihood that the prosecutor failed to follow the courts suggestion to get a rebuttal affidavit unless he attempted to do so and failed, there is also evidence in the appellate record that the prosecutor in fact conducted juror interviews. by the time of the hearing on the wheeler motion at the beginning of the penalty phase proceedings, the prosecutor had identified a particular juror, Katherine Tripp, as a result of her medical training, as having caused the other jurors to decide “that there was some indication of diminished capacity”. From petitioner taped statement to the police officer.(RT 4766-4767). On that basis, the prosecutor allegedly concluded that a female with medical training would deny the people a fair trial at the penalty phase (i.D). Such detailed information could have not been available without interviewing the jurors, since it is nowhere else in the record. The jurors having informed defense counsel as soon as they walked out of the courtroom that there had been no guilt verdict (RT 3254) The court ruled, “I don’t believe these declarations of affidavits, i don’t believe them at all,” and denied the motion. Juror Tripp further stated that the differences among the juror arose from a perception by some that the mastermind was Ida Moore rather than petitioner, that a result of his drug problems he likely had no intent to kill anyone, and that he was “just along for the ride” she also stated that the jorous had been mislead by the judge into thinking they could not take petitioners drug use into consideration this will conclude the discussion of the denial of confrontation and cross examination, Petitioner will now argue the denial.
 Argument II

TWO OF THE THREE JURORS HAD INFORMED DEFENSE COUNSEL OF THE LACK OF A VOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE JURY HUNG ON THE ISSUE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, INSUMMARY THE THREE JUROR TESTIFIED THAT THEIR HAD BEEN NO VOTE ON THE GUILT VERDICTS, that those guilt verdicts were not authorized and were no unanimously, and that the decision, unanimous or otherwise, had been reached on intent for purpose of either guilt or special circumstances, violation of fundamental rights can be challenged on habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that the defects so affected the regularity oft he trial and conviction “As to violate the fundamental aspects of ” fairness and result in a misscarage of justice. Procedural rights that may be grounds for the issuance of writ include denial of impairment of jury trial in re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal 2d 613[73 CAAL.RPTR. 21]; denial or impairment of the right to representation by competent counsel during criminal proceedings. The record contains three unrebutted affidavits from guilt-phase jurors stating that the foreman had prematurely and improperly submitted guilt verdict. The trial court reviewed the affidavits of at least on juror, Preferably the foreman to crate an issue of facts (id) witness affidavits was testimonial evidence and violated confrontation Davis v Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) Statement, that was not subject to cross examination violates confrontation.The prosecutor chaos not ot ut on any witness and did not ask for further time to be able to do so, all witnesses were on call for live testimony, the prosecutor relied exclusively on yeh allegedly unanimous silent reply of the jurors which had been already presented to the courts (CT-490) see Brady v Maryland to provide exculpatory evidence must be (1) favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeachment material (2) suppressed by eh government, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) material or prejudicial. The government has a duty to disclose Brady material even in the absence of a request by the defense. For the purposes of Brady, materiality is measured ” in terms of suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item by item. That is, the reviewing court should assess the “calmative effect ” of the suppressed evidence. At the trial court ruled, ” I don’t believe that at all” and denied the motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (RT-3252); Abuse of discretion implies arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking where the court exceeds all grounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. The prosecutor had identified a particular juror, apparently Katherine Tripp, as a result t of her medical training, as having caused the other jurors to decide ” that there was some indication of diminished capacity” from petitioner taped statement to the the police officer(RT 4766-4767)

on the basis, the prosecutor allegedly conclude that a female with medical training would deny the people a fair trial at the penalty phase (id) such detailed information could not have been available without interviewing the jurors, since i t is ” nowhere else in the record”. the court of appeals treated impeachment evidence as constitution;a different from exculpatory evidence. according to that court, failure to disclose impeachment evidence “because it threatens the defendant right to confront adverse witness” 719 F.2d at 1464. Relying on Davis v Alaska, 415 U.S.. 308 (1974), the court of appeals held that the government failure to disclosure requested impeachment evidence that the defense could use to conduct an effective cross- examination of IM portent prosecution witnesses (CT 479, 480) Constitutes “constitutional error of the first magnitude” requiring automatic reversal.. Quoting Davis nv Alaska, supra , at 415 U.S.. 318)( the right of confrontation conferred by the sixth amendment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness and accuracy of criminal trial)

the appellate court found forfeiture as to the confrontation issue. note that a defendant is not precluded from racing for the first time on appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of certain fundamental constitution., and finally petitioner claims a violation of his fundamental constitutional rights. thus in re Winchester, 53 CAL 2d 528, Haebeau Corpus Petition has become a proper remedy in this state to collaterally attach a judgment of conviction which has been obtained in violation of fundamental constitution rights” Federal rules permits state prisoner to seek habeas relief in federal court if he alleges he in custody in violation of federal constitution. Past cases have thus permitted a habeas corpus petitioner to renew a claim of fundamental constition error that has previously been rejected on appeal. state constitiontion. the California constition was amended i 1974 to include a new specific guarantee on the right… to be confronted with the witness against the defendant (CAL Const. Art.1. 15). This amendment, however, is declaratory of a state constitional right previously incorporated in due process guarantees and and of the statutory right under p c 686 (3). Therefore, decisional law antedating the 1974 amendment is still valid. People v Contreras (1976) 57 C.A. 3 d 816, 818, 129 CR. 397)

This claim of miscarriage of justice, in violation of the confrontation clause, argument is based on newly discovered evidence, found through due diligence and relative case law on April 2015, petitioner dilegtly pursuing his federally guaranteed U.S.. const. rights, relying on newly discovered evidence through due diligence, People v Mccarry , 42 Cal 2d 429, people v miller, 37CAL 2d new relative case law and permissible retroactivity, the appellate court found forfeiture as to the confrontation issue. note that a defendant is not precluded from raising for the first time on appeal a claim asserting the deprivation of certain fundamental constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION III :PROSECUTION SUPPRESSION OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF AFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE JURORS. 

Three jurors testified by affidavit on a new trial motion that the foreman had, without thier permission, signed the verdict forms as to petioners guilt before aany desiciinn been mae or vote taken on the subject of guilt, the three jurors were katherine tripp, robert cole and margret byous, poleple of widely disparate backgrounds. Ms. Tripp a housewive and medical student with an undergraduate degree in biology ans working on an MD, Came from a highly sophisticated family, with an uncle and brother who are lawyers, a husband who is a senior engineer with huges aircracft reponsible for managing mutimilloin dollar projects, a daughter who is an oil company geologist, and a son who is a law student. Robert cole is a truck driver with the city of los angles with three college educated adult children, Magret Byous was an unemployment insurance interviewer with california human resourse development department, with the responsibility to decide whether or not unemployment applicats are entitled to benifits. all of the assured the court in voir dire that they could and would be fair and impartial.

Ms Tripp Testified in he Declaration:

that the 4 guilty verdicts ofmurder i the first degree returned on decmber 11 1986, were not unaimous verdicts because “I had not voted to return verdicts of first degree murder. That i was shoked and aghast when the foreman, john porter, indicated to the court that the jury had reached a verdict and turned the verdict form over tot he bailiff. ALthough the jury had discussed possible verdicts, i didnot vote for guilty because i wanted the question pending before the court regarding intent to be answered first, before i would vote one way or the other. That i had no idea that the foreman had signed the verdict forms until they were turned in. That when thee jury came out into the court room at approximatley 4;00pm on Decmber 11, 1986, i Thought it was only to answer the qustion i had, not to return any verdicts. Prior to coming out, the jury had not buxzzed” that we hada a verdict. That any verdict i would have returned would have been after the question to the following: why was paragraph four at page 42 included to aid in the killing mean? Does this mean physically particpating in the actual death? was given that i did not speak up or say anything when john prter turned in the verdict forms because before the jury instrucuctions were read to us, judge morrow admonished us, in essence ” that you cant change the verdict form once the form ahs been turned in” That once the formena had turned in the verdict forms and we continued to deliberate, i ferused to vote for true, as to the special circumstances allegation because of the question regarding intent and the fact that i had not voted to return a verdict of guilty for murder in the first degree.

Robert COle testified in his declaration

that the 4 guilty verdicts ofmurder i the first degree returned on decmber 11 1986, were not unaimous verdicts because for one I had not voted to return any verdicts. that when the foreman, john porter, turned in the verdict forms it was a suprise, as well as being withou my consent or vote. At the time the forman turned in the verdict forms, the jury was discussing murder, but three were certainly no agreement reached. That several questions were still being asked and consider regariding intent and special circumstances, when the jury came out to have a question answered. Instead, the foreman turned in the verdict forms. That i did not alert the court of the foreman action because judge morrow had previosly told us that the verdicts could not be change once the forms were turned in. that when the jury was called upon to answer the question regarding special circumstances, i refused to vote becaus eof the previos acts of the forman of signing and turning in the verdict forms that i did not vote for. Also there were still alot of qustions regarding intent.

Margret byous testified in her Delcartation

that the 4 guilty verdicts ofmurder i the first degree returned on decmber 11 1986, were not unaimous verdicts because all twelve juror had not voted to return verdicts of first degree murder.that from the very begining the formena, john porter was a disruptive force. this because he attempted to rush through the evidence, without allowing other juror to examine and discuss various aspects of the evidence, especially regarding intent.That when John Porter indicated to the courts that the jury had reached a verdict, his statement was totally false . At the time the time the verdict forms were tuned in, the jury was merely discussing various aspects of murder, both first and second degree, as intent and special circumstances. Also several questions regarding intent wa s till pending and being discussed, when the foreman indicated there was a verdict.That the jury entered the court room on Decmber 11, 1986 at approximatley 4;00pm., to have a question answered and not to return any verdict. That unbeknownkst to me, as well as several other jurors, the foreman signed the verdict and it sertainlly not my behest. That i did no speak up or indicate to the court that what foreman did was improper because iflet i was without the power to do so. This is because a;; comminication betwerrn the court and the jury was limited to the foreman, an dJudgeMorrow had previosly indicated to the jury that “Once the verdict forms was signed, it was cast in stone”.

In summary, the thre jurors testified that there had been no vote on the guilt verdict, that those verdicts were not authorized and were not unanimous or otherwise, was reached on intent as to either guilt or special circumstances. . Upon presentation of the affidavits, the court noted that it had reviewed the records as the return of the verdicts as presented by the prosecuter, that there was no “CONFLICT” in the evidence and that consequently the prosecutor would have to obtain at least the affidavite of one juror, preferably the foreman (id), but when the parties returned to court he chose not to put any witnesses and did not ask for further time to be able to dos so, although the three witnesses were on call for live testimony the prosecutor made no attempt to cross examine them. Rather, he replied exclusively on the alledly unamious silent reply of the juror to the clerks question when the verdict was read, “Is this your verdict, so say you on, so say you all?”, which he had already presented to the court and which the court had already reviewed and found not to create a “SUFFICIENT CONFLICT”; both parteies had waived polling of the jury at the time the verdict was announced.

Not withstanding his prior admonition to the prosecutor that int the absence of testimony from a juror there would “NO CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE” and despite the peoples unexplianed failuer to produce such testimony from which a reasonable inference might be drawn that the people had follewd the courts recommendation to seek an affidavit but had been unable to obtain a juror who would contradict the three affidavit on file, apart from the unlikelihood of the poeple having failed to follow the courts suggestion to get a rebuttal unless they attemtped to d so and failed, there is added reason to believe thatt hte people infact conducted juror interviews. By the time of the hearing on the HEELER motion at the beginnig of the penalty phase proceedings, the people had identified a particular juor, apparently Katherine Tripp as a result of her medical training, aas having caused the other jurors to decide” that there was some indication of diminished capacity” from MR. Williams taped statemant tot eh police officer. On the basis, the presecutor allegdly ocncluded that a female with medical training would deny the people fair traiial at the penalty phase(id), it does not appera that such detailed information could be available without interviewng the juror, since it ts nowehre else in the record.

The court ruled, “I dont believe the declarations or affidavits, i dont belive them at all” and denoed the motion.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW GUILT TRIAL BASED UPON JURY MISCONDUCT

As discussed above, the seriously conflicted trial judge, despite having strongly recommended to the prosecutor that he obtain the declarations of the jury foreman and given him ample time to do so, proceeded to rule against petitioner, darren wWilliams on his motion for new trial witout the benifit of ANY rubuttal declaration.

assuming the declarations not to have been perjured, a new trial in this cse was mandatory. As this court has held,

The consttitution gurantees the fundamental right to unanimous jury verdict, unanimity obviously requires that each jury must vote and acquiese in the verdict. Acquiesences simply because the verdict has ben reached by the majority is not an independent judgement, and if permitted, would undermine the rihgt to a unanimous verdict.

Moreover, since the three declarats had been given the oppurtunity under the instruction as they understood them to express doubt or disaggreemnt with the verdict IN Open COurt, Therre was never never any verdicrt rendered within legal sense. Had the three declarants understood thier right to dissent at any time prior to recordation of the verdict, it is clear both form thier delcartions and from thier statemnt to defense counslel, immediatley after thier dischsrge,t hat they would have expressed dissent from the verdict in open court, therby producing a hung jury. Accordingly, a new guilt trial is required in this case both because the undisputed evidence shows that there was never any vote in the jury room,a nd becasue under the instructions there was never any opportunity given to dissent from the verdict after the form was signed by the forman.

Argument III

In summary the prosecution for the people suppressed material substantial evidence that was subject to cross-examine nation Crawford vs Washington the above witnesses affidavits where testimonial evidence taking and declare under penalty of perjury the suppression of the evidence by the prosecution violated the Confrontation Clause C Davis vs Washington the prosecution was ordered by the trial court to produce the evidence that the prosecution failed to follow the court’s instructions the prosecution denied petitioner a fair trial and furthermore the prosecution denied petitioner Deron Williams newly discovered evidence that the foreman John Porter drew misconduct was erroneous and violative of petitioner California and United States Constitution does the name petitioner Deron Williams a new trial on his motion for a new trial because this type of evidence can make the difference between conviction and acquittal Pennsylvania vs Richie 1:07 argues that the failure to disclose information that might have made cross-examination more effective undermines the Confrontation Clause purpose of increasing the accuracy of the truth finding proceedings at trial see United States vs nada prosecution refused to create a conflict in the record when the witnesses were on standby for live testimony our Constitution provides that no person shall be the prime of life liberty or property without due process of law the Fifth Amendment applies this limitation to the federal government and the Fourteenth Amendment and poses the same restrictions on the state the forward due process of law has been the center of substantial legal debate over the years the chambers vs Florida the suppression by the prosecution was impeachment evidence against the jury foreman John Porter for his misconduct in the jury room the Court of Appeals treated impeachment evidence as constitutional different from exculpatory evidence. according to the court, failure to disclose impeachment evidence is quote even more erroneous then failure to disclose exculpatory evidence quotes because it threatens the defendant’s right to confront and various witnesses. the Court of Appeals held that the government failure to disclose requested impeachment evidence that the defense could used to conduct an effective cross examination of important prosecution witnesses constitutes constitutional error of the first magnitude requiring automatic reversal. The right of defective and cross examination which would be constitutional error of the first magnitude, and no amount of showing of what of President was curious Brookhart vs Janice . see also United States versus chronic the prosecution responsibility for failing to disclose known favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable whether that is a failure to disclose is in good faith, or bad faith. See Brady, 3732, s,. exonerated evidence in the hands of the police, non-disclosure is a due process violation, even though the prosecution is unaware of the evidence, kyles vs Whitley ,. When police or prosecutors concealed significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the state’s possession it is ordinarily incumbent on the state to set the record straight in banks, this concealment was found through discovery in the course of petitioner’s habeas corpus proceedings some 12 years after his conviction of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prior to trial the prosecution advised defense counsel that there was no legal litigate discovery issue because the prosecution would provide all discovery to which the defense was entitled, without the necessity of a motion. However, the prosecution withheld evidence that would have enabled petitioner to discredit to essential prosecution witnesses it did not disclose that one of them was a police informant nor did it disclose a pretrial transcript that show the other witness had been intensively coach by prosecutors and law enforcement officers. The prosecution did not give warning when the informant testified intrusively that he never gave police a statement and had not talked to a police officer until a few days before trial. Instead, the prosecutor argue to the court that the witnesses have been open and honest in his testimony was entirely unrehearsed. This impeaching evidence was kept secret throughout the trial during direct appeal, and on collateral proceeding, until it was finally revealed in the habeas corpus proceedings. The habeas petition was revised by the circuit court held reverse.

The trial court advised the prosecution that there was no conflict in the evidence that was presented to the court by the prosecution, and that consequently the prosecutor would have to obtain the affidavit of at least $1 preferably the foreman, to create an issue of fact. When the parties return to court, the prosecutor chose not to put on any witnesses and did not ask for further time to be able to do so although the three witnesses were on call for life testimony, the prosecutor made no attempt to cross-examine them, rather, he relied exclusively on allegedly unanimous sorry reply of the drawers to the clerks question on when the verdict was red, so say you one, so see you all? , which he had already presented to the court in which the court had already review and determined and found not to create a sufficient conflict. apart from the unlikelihood that the prosecutor failed to follow the court suggestions to get a rebuttal affidavit and less heat attempted to do so and fell, there is also clear evidence in the appellant record that the prosecutor in fact conducted during interviews. By the time of the hearing on the Wheeler motion at the beginning of the penalty phase preceding the prosecutor had identified a particular job, apparently Catherine trip, as a result of her medical training, as having cause the other drawers to decide that there was some indication of diminished capacity from petitioners taped statement to the police officer. on the basis, the prosecutor allegedly concluded that a female with medical training with the 9 the people a fair trial at the thinner penalty phase. Such detail information could not have been available without interviewing the jewelry since it is nowhere else in the record and finally this argument concluded with the United States Supreme Court, as long ago as money vs holohan , the United States Supreme Court made clear that deliberate deception of a car and drove by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. This was reaffirmed in pile vs Kansas, we said, the same result of time when the state, although not soliciting false evidence, allow it to go on corrected when it appears. There after Brady versus Maryland, hell that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. See American Bar Association, project on standards for criminal justice, prosecution function and the defense function. When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinated of guilt or innocence, non disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within the general rule.

We do not, however, automatically require a neutral whenever they coming of the prostitute herself after the trial of disclose everything possible to go to the bathroom but not likely to change change the verdict… United States vs Keogh. A finding of materiality of the eviden
ce is required under Brady, supra, at 87, 83 s. CT., at 11 96,. a new trial is required if the false testimony could… In any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.

Discussion IV

Three jurors testified that jewelry for men, John Porter, erroneously committed jury misconduct, by signing the verdict form, when no vote to either guilt or innocent had been voted on, because just wanted the question pending before the court regarding intent to be answered first, before they will vote one way or the other, upon presentation of the affidavits, the prosecution presented the affidavits to the trial court, the trial court determined that there was no conflict in the evidence, and that consequently the prosecution would have to obtain the affidavit of at least one or preferably the foreman John Porter to create an issue of fact. When the party’s return from adjournment , the prosecution chose not to put on any witnesses and did not ask the court for further time to be able to do so. Although the three witnesses were on call for live testimony, the prosecution made no attempt to cross examine them

Argument  IV

The third situation identified by the court instate vs angers, is where the defense makes a specific request in the prosecutor fails to disclose responsive evidence. The Court did not define the standard of material in applicable in the situation, but suggested that the standard might be more lenient to the defense than in the situation in which the defense make no request for only a general request. Also notice when the prosecutor received a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any responsible is seldom, if ever, excusable. The United States Supreme Court has relied on and we formulated the agreed standard for the material of undisclosed evidence until subsequent cases arising outside the Brady versus Maryland 1963. in it and neither case did the court discussion of the argue standard distinguish among the three situations described in acres. And United States vs Valenzuela – bernal , the court held that due process is violated when testimony is made unavailable to the defense by government declaration of witnesses only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the United States vs Bagley tryer of fact. and in Strickland vs Washington Strickler vs Washington, the court held that a new trial must be granted when evidence is not introduced because of the incompetency of counsel only if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. The Strickland Court defines a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

First, it is established that a convictions of time through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the state, must fall under the 14th amendment, Monee vs Hollohan. The same results obtained when the state, although not soliciting boss evidence, allows it to go on corrected when it appears. The United States Supreme Court stated trial by jury has been established by the Constitution as the normal and… Preferably mold of disposing of issue of fact in criminal case. Patton vs United States. the prosecution presented impeaching evidence of exculpatory evidence, to the trial court. that John Porter jury foreman committed erroneous misconduct, the trial court’s observation and determination of the three drawers affidavit, determine that the affidavit did not create a conflict in the evidence, the trial court gave specific order to the prosecution to obtain an affidavit from the jury foreman preferably, John Porter to create an issue of fact. The prosecution chose to ignore the court order and not put any witnesses fun. although the three witnesses were on call for life testimony, the prosecution made no attempt to cross-examine, the three drawers. But if they relied on false uncontroverted and misleading testimony that had already been determined not to create and conflict is the evidence, the prosecution also relied on the jury foreman, John Porter erroneous misconduct, in reference to the verdict forms that he misrepresented to the trial court as being the most of the three dieting jurors to mislead the court.

In finally it is well established that the fundamental fairness guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense. This constitutional principle prohibits the state from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the state of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of crime. mandatory presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the state of the burden of persuasion on an element of the offense. by contrast. A permissive appearance is not a violations of due process because the state still has the burden of persuading the jury that the suggested conclusions should be inferred based on the predicate facts Pro proved. Ulster County car vs Allen. Whether a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, cedar Catherine trip, and her 1990 supplemental declaration reaffirming her position under oath for petitioner state habeas corpus exhibit a A. No, in which she reaffirm the lack of a proper vote or verdict in that the three disinterest had not spoken up because of the judge erroneous set in stone instruction. Was properly denied the car are persuaded by the acumen gained by a trial judge over the course of the proceedings makes her well qualified to rule on the basis of affidavit, without a hearing. United States vs Hamilton, where evidentiary hearing our order, it is because of certain unique situations typically involving allegations of jury tampering,  prosecutorial misconduct, or third party confessions . in this case upon presentation of the affidavits, the court noted that it had reviewed the record as to the return of the verdict aspirated presented by the prosecutor, that there was no conflict in the evidence, and that consequently the prosecutor would have to obtain the affidavit of at least one drawer, preferably the form in, John Porter to create an issue of fact. the prosecutor chose not to put on any witnesses and did not ask for further time to be able to do so. Although the three witnesses were on call for live testimony, the prosecutor made no attempt to cross-examine them. Rather, he relied exclusively on the allegedly unanimous silent reply of the doors to the clerks question when the verdict was read, is this your verdict, so say you one, so say you are?, which he had already presented to the court and which the court had already reviewed and found not to create a sufficient conflict, the dress, having informed defense counsel as soon as they walked out of the courtroom that there had been no guilt verdict, the court ruled, I don’t believe these declarations are affidavits, I don’t believe them at all in quotes and denied the motion for a neutral based on on collaborated evidence by the prosecution’s injury misconduct.

Discussion V

 

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